Never trust a naked inspector

An article by Gary Milhollin of the Wisconsin Program on Nuclear Arms Control pretty much summarizes why the current U.N.-sanctioned inspection scheme must fail. He provides necessary details in a November 26, 2002 Wall Street Journal editorial page article.

The fault lies with the diplomatic mentality that must at all costs prize process over results. After all, it is the processes of diplomacy that allow all of these international bureaucrats to continue their well-paid, tax-free lifestyles over years if not decades. And quite a lifestyle it is for those who work out of the various U.N. headquarters in such rundown, disease-ridden poverty-stricken places as Geneva, New York, and Vienna.

Your humble blogger has tasted of this fruit, as he was at one time seconded as a (very) part-time "expert" from his U.S. government post to the International Atomic Energy Agency to assist some of their nuclear inspection efforts. [This was a very long time ago and did not deal directly with Iraq, so I claim no insider's knowledge about the current situation. And, I did not spend very much time hobnobbing with the boyos in Vienna; after seeing what actually went on within the IAEA, I decided it was a sham and not worth the effort] My conclusions about the IAEA, and hence Hans Blix, its long-time director general:

• diversity on a regional and national basis at every management level of the IAEA is more important than actual expertise
• the tension between have and have-not nations is more important than preventing nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
• to get anything accomplished requires a consensus of the Board of Governors, and this is neither easy to obtain nor timely
• at best, all the IAEA can do if verify that a diversion (of material or technology) has occurred; in no wise can it prevent it, unless one believes that toothless sanctions will do the trick.

An example of the swift, hammer-like "action" of the IAEA is reflected on their website (nice design, by the way...at least their webtechs are good) with this mighty pronouncement:

In Vienna 29 November, the IAEA Board of Governors called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to accept "without delay" talks proposed by the Agency to clarify recent disclosures about the DPRK

Now, this is six weeks (mid-October) since the North Koreans blandly admitted to having a nuclear weapons capability. And the IAEA has just gotten around to insisting that there be "talks" "without delay" to do what? To "clarify" things.

I recognize that Hans Blix is not now running an IAEA inspection. But can there be any doubt that his mode of operation will be very much taken from the IAEA big 'ol book of how not to find the obvious? If the United States continues to go along with the charade of see-no evil, hear-no evil, speak-no evil inspections, shame on us. President Bush, you and your administration look quite wobbly at this moment, to quietly acquiesce in such a sham.